We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems, including the design of externality resistant auctions and a variant of multi-dimensional scheduling.
1. INTRODUCTION
Externalities
Mechanisms with externalities, and specifically altruism and spite, but also others ("the joy of winning", "malice"), have been studied at length in the literature. Experiments seem to indicate that both altruism and spite have an observable effect, and various theoretical models have been proposed to deal with this issue.
We quote higher authority (Cooper and Fang [16] ) in the context of 2nd price auctions: "We found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values, supporting a modified 'joy of winning' hypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values, consistent with the 'spite' hypothesis."
A partial list of (experimental and theoretical) references dealing with externalities is [20, 22, 23, 19, 9, 25, 26, 5, 31, 9, 24, 16, 14, 13, 11, 12] . The questions addressed in previous work primarily deal with the impact of externalities on the equilibria, e.g., observing that externalities such as "the joy or winning" or "spite" lead to overbidding in some auction mechanisms, or that externalities modeled as altruism lead to more-or-less balanced outcomes in the ultimatum game, although neither of these phenomena would be considered "reasonable" if one assumes no externalities. In recent years, the price of anarchy as impacted by such externalities has also been the subject of much research, e.g., malice in congestion games [26, 5, 31] .
In this paper we consider a somewhat different goal: we seek to devise mechanisms that overcome externalities. As a basic motivating example consider an auction selling a single item. The Vickrey second-price auction is dominant strategy incentive compatible. But, try to imagine that the bidders who lose are spiteful towards the winner (although this is really hard to believe). They may have reason to increase their bid so as to increase the payment by the winning agent.
Even more worrisome -say that the only spiteful losers are those who took part in the various experimental psychology studies cited above, and they did so only so as to mislead the researchers. In fact, we who reside in Utopia will never, ever, encounter spite. This is a fact, but it does not imply that everyone believes that it is so, it does not imply that everyone believes that everyone believes that it is so, it does not imply that this is common knowledge. Ergo, just the concept of spite (transmitted via the apple from the Garden of Eden), even if in fact there are no spiteful bidders, implies that bidders may have an incentive not to bid truthfully in the VCG mechanism.
So, why not define the agent type to include all possible externalities and then run VCG? There are two problems here: (1) It is impossible; payments to one agent impact the utility of another, we are no longer in the quasi-linear setting, (2) Ignoring the former concern (i.e., impossibility), what social welfare are we optimizing? Is it our goal to pander to the spiteful masses? Offer them bread and circuses? Execute the winners during the lunch break of the Gladiatorial games? There are indications from the lives of the Caesars that this may actually maximize (spiteful) social welfare.
So, the very existence of the concept of spite seems to threaten the fundamentals of mechanism design.
To address these issues, we study an alternative utility model: We assume that agents have two utility functions, a base utility, and an externality-modified utility which is a linear combination of other agent utilities. Variants of this model appear in Ledyard [22] , Levine [23] , Chen and Kempe [14, 13, 11] , and many other papers. The PhD thesis of Chen [11] includes numerous relevant papers.
Externality Resistant Mechanisms
We present a new type of private value mechanism, rVCG. Assume that it is common knowledge that no one is willing to lose more than (say) γ = 5 cents so as to increase another's payment by $1. Now:
1. Agents using the rVCG mechanism are sure that the following two values are approximately equal:
• The utility they obtain under rVCG, in an imperfect world, where externalities are real, and demons roam the earth.
• The utility they would have obtained under VCG, in an imaginary, Utopian world, where externalities did not exist. (See Theorem 2).
I.e., given a bound, γ, on the altruism/spite, the rVCG mechanism approximates Utopia, as promised in the title. 2. On the other hand, irrespective of how infinitesimally small γ > 0 may be, a losing bidder in a second-price auction, may, out of spite, even infintesimally small spite, reduce the winner's profit to zero. (This holds in the more general VCG mechanism as well).
Strongly Truthful Mechanisms
To achieve externality resistant mechanisms we make use of strongly truthful mechanisms. These are mechanisms where it is not only a weakly dominant strategy to be truthful but where one gets punished for lying. The goal in the design of strongly truthful mechanisms is to increase the punishment as much as possible. Strongly truthful mechanisms are related to strongly convex mechanisms, analogous to the connection between truthful mechanisms and convex utility functions, (see, e.g., Archer and Kleinberg, [3, 2] ).
For bounded domains, we give (optimal) strongly truthful mechanisms, in this case, the punishment for the lieṽ = v+δ is O(δ 2 ). For unbounded domains, we give a mechanism that is relatively strongly truthful where the lie is measured as a fraction of the truth, and the punishment for the lieṽ = (1+α)v, where α ∈ Θ(1), is v/ log 1+ǫ v. Strongly truthful mechanisms can also be used in mechanisms for multi-dimensional problems such as makespan minimization for unrelated machines, see below.
This idea of combining multiple mechanisms to boost truthfulness appears in [29] , where it is used to derive truthful mechanisms for some problems via differential privacy. It also appears implicitly in the context of scoring rules [10, 7] , and in the related responsive lotteries [17] so as to determine the true utility of an outcome. However, we are unaware of previous attempts to quantify the quality of such devices, nor are we aware of other attempts to apply them towards externality resistance or for multidimensional problems.
In the appendix we describe transformations between strongly truthful mechanisms and proper scoring rules. This automatically implies transformations between strongly truthful mechanisms, market scoring rules, responsive lotteries, and market maker pricing algorithms to provide liquidity for prediction markets [18, 32, 15] . Strongly truthful mechanisms are also related to Bregman divergence [1] , a concept similar to strong convexity.
The Solution Concept
Adapting a solution concept from Babaioff, Lavi and Pavlov, [6] , from approximation problems to arbitrary predicates, we say that a mechanism M is an algorithmic implementation of a predicate P in undominated strategies, if, for all agents i, there exists a set of strategies, Di, such that 1. The output of M satisfies P , for any combination of strategies from j Dj , and, 2. For all i, for any agent i strategy, s / ∈ Di, there exists some strategy s ′ ∈ Di that is strictly better for agent i than strategy s, irrespective of what strategies are chosen by the other agents.
I.e., predicate P is implemented by a mechanism in undominated strategies, if, in the game defined by the mechanism, and as long as no agent chooses a strategy that is obviously dominated (for arbitrary assumptions about the types of other agents, e.g., values, bids, externalities), predicate P holds for the outcome of the mechanism.
In the context of externality resistant auctions, as long as agents do not bid stupidly (do not use a strategy that is obviously dominated), externality resistance holds.
In fact, any strategy that entails bidding "too far away" from the truth is dominated by bidding truthfully, where "too far away" for agent i is a function of her own externalities γij (see Section 3 for a definition of these externalities). Moreover, agents can efficiently determine that bidding far from the truth is dominated by truthful bidding. Thus, Di is contained in the set of all bids whose distance from the truth is not too big. Note that we don't make any claim on the precise strategies that will be adapted by the agents.
Other Applications
We can also use strongly truthful mechanisms to achieve goals such as minimizing the makespan in a multi dimensional machine scheduling problem, the infamous Nisan-Ronen problem, see [28, 21, 4] . This magic is achieved by changing the problem, and allowing one to repeatedly assign the same job to a machine. So, choosing to verify the truthfullness of the agent types can be done by choosing at random, with some small probability, a target agent, and using strongly truthful mechanisms to punish the agent for misrepresentation of his type.
Given a sufficiently large punishment, all agents will have incentive to stick close to the truth. So, with high probability, the mechanism will achieve a close approximation to the minimum makespan in undominated strategies. We leave the details for the full version of the paper. This is quite general and can be used in other multidimensional settings where one can boost truth extraction by repetition.
STRONGLY TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS
A key ingredient in our constructions is the notion of a strongly truthful mechanism. In this section, we define strongly truthful mechanisms for single dimensional problems and one agent. As discussed below, these definitions and results extend to multi-dimensional and multi-agent settings.
Consider a single dimensional agent with private value (type) v for receiving a good or service. A direct revelation mechanism takes as input some (possibly false) value,ṽ, computes a payment, p(ṽ), and allocates the good to the agent with probability a(ṽ).
The standard quasilinear utility of an agent whose true value is v, but reports valueṽ (possibly different from v), is denoted by
We also define
i.e., the utility to the agent with value v when truthfully reportingṽ = v. In this setting, it follows from Myerson [27] , that a mechanism is truthful in expectation if and only if
• the allocation probability function a(v) is monotone nondecreasing, and
• the payment function is
for some constant p(0). (We will take p(0) = 0 herein).
It follows from the above and from Equation 1 that
Thus, for truthful in expectation mechanisms, it must be that 1. The utility function u(v) is convex (the integral of a nondecreasing function).
The allocation function a(v)
3. Any convex function u(v) whose subgradient, u ′ (v), lies in the range [0, 1], can be interpreted as the utility function for an associated truthful in expectation mechanism.
4. Ergo, if restricting oneself to truthful in expectation mechanisms, one can describe a mechanism using utility functions or allocation functions interchangeably.
(Up to additive constants).
We seek to strengthen the notion of truthfulness in expectation so that the greater the deviation from the truth, the greater the loss in utility.
To this end, we define c-strongly truthful mechanisms as follows:
A mechanism with utility function u is called c-strongly truthful if for every v andṽ:
This definition enables us to extend the connection between truthfulness and convexity to strongly truthful mechanisms. For this, recall the standard notion of strong convexity. For a differentiable function f (x), convexity is equivalent to:
The following notion is also standard [8] :
Definition 2. Let m ≥ 0. A function f is called m-strongly convex if and only if for every x, x ′ :
By defining strong truthfulness as in Equation (2) Proof. Applying equation (1) to uv(ṽ) and uṽ(ṽ), we get
It follows that
Since by definition, the mechanism is m-strongly truthful if and only if uv(v) − uv(ṽ) ≥ 1 2 m |ṽ − v| 2 , we derive that the mechanism is m-strongly truthful if and only if
m |ṽ − v| 2 , which is precisely the definition that u(v) is m-strongly convex.
Remark: All of the definitions in this section extend naturally to multi-dimensional agents. Indeed, the three equivalent definitions of a doubly differentiable function being convex (the standard one, cycle monotonicity, and the Hessian being positive semidefinite) have analogues when discussing truthful multidimensional mechanisms over convex domains [8, 30] . Similarly, the equivalent notions of strongconvexity and strong truthfulness extend mutatis mutandis.
It follows from the above theorem that the question of finding the strongest truthful mechanism is an extremal question about strongly convex functions whose partial derivatives satisfy appropriate constraints that capture the constraints of the allocation probabilities (for example, for the single item case the constraint is the derivative of the utility is in [0, 1]).
Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Single Agent, Single Item Auctions
Consider the case in which we want to find the strongest truthful mechanism for a single player and one item. (We will use this in the next section.) To start, assume that the agent's value is bounded: v ∈ [L, H]. For this case, we define the linear mechanism: 
Proof. It is straightforward to check that for the linear mechanism, the utility function u(v) is
. We can directly verify that Equation (3) in the definition of strong convexity holds with equality for all v, with m = 1/(H − L). Indeed, we derive the following equivalences
the last equality clearly holds. We now show that this is the strongest truthful mechanism. From the definition of strong convexity for the extreme values of the domain, we get
Adding these two, we get that
Since u ′ (L), and u ′ (H) are in [0, 1] (they represent allocations), we get that m ≤ 1/(H − L).
Remarks:
• There is a direct connection between single-agent truthful mechanisms and scoring rules (see e.g., [7] ). Indeed, one can define a notion of strongly proper scoring rules that is analogous to a strongly truthful mechanism. We note that the mechanism just described is in fact the well-known quadratic scoring rule.
• Definition 3 and Theorem 1 can easily be generalized to the case of one player and many items with additive valuations. In this case the utility is u(v) = m j=1
, for which m = 1 n(H−L) .
Relative strong truthfulness
If we want to consider unbounded domains, it follows from Theorem 1 that no m-strongly truthful mechanism exists with m > 0.
For such domains, it may be useful to define a notion of relative strong truthfulness as follows:
For example, it is easy to show that the single agent mechanism with allocation rule a(v) = 1−
). Slightly better
EXTERNALITY RESISTANT AUCTIONS
In this section, we consider how strongly truthful, or truthextraction mechanisms can be used to help cope with spiteful or altruistic bidders. Our goal is to ensure that a bidder participating in, say, an auction for a single item, does not need to worry about her competitor purposely bidding high just so as to make her pay a lot.
We consider the setting where an auctioneer wishes to maximize social welfare, and each agent has a value vi for being one of the winners in the auction. Of course, in the standard version of this setting, the mechanism of choice would be the VCG mechanism.
As we have already discussed however, the VCG mechanism is entirely vulnerable to spiteful agents. Before explaining the alternative we propose, we define a utility model for externalities that captures precisely what we mean when we speak about spiteful and altruistic agents.
In the externality-modified setting, agent i's type ti consists of
• vi, her value for service; and
• a set of externality parameters γij for all j = i. Intuitively, γij represents how much agent i cares about the utility of agent j. A large, negative value means that i is significantly motivated by the desire to decrease agent j's utility, whereas a large, positive value means that i seeks to increase agent j's utility. A value of zero means that i is indifferent towards j. 2 The following sequence of mechanisms are defined for every k > 1 and approach f (v, α) = Ω(
and so on.
Let M be an arbitrary mechanism for the single-parameter allocation problem under consideration. The mechanism takes as input a bid bi from each agent (which is equal to vi if the mechanism is truthful) and produces as output an allocation x, where xi is the probability that agent i receives service, and payments p, with pi the expected payment by agent i. Note that both xi = xi(b) and pi = pi(b) are functions of the bids. The allocation selected must satisfy the feasibility constraints of the setting, however, we do assume, that having only a single arbitrary agent receive service is feasible.
Given bids b−i of all players except player i, the base (standard) utility of agent i, when her bid is bi and her type is ti = (vi, {γi1, . . . , γin}), is denoted by u M v i (bi, b−i) and is defined as
Notice that this utility depends only on vi and not on the rest of agent i's private information (agent i's externality parameters γij). This is why we subscript the utility by vi instead of ti.
We define the externality-modified utility u M t i of agent i when the types of the agents are t and the bids are b as
This model (and variants thereof) have been used previously in several papers, e.g. [23, 11] . Note that
• Because the externality-modified utility defined above depends, not only on the bids (or actions) of other agents, b−i, but also on their types, we add the t−i as an argument to the utility function, which is atypical.
(Of course the only part of t−i the utility depends on is v−i.)
• The value of t−i is, in general, unknown to agent i, so agent i will be, in general, unable to compute her externality modified utility u M t i (b, t−i). • We will be particularly interested in cases where the mechanism M that is being run is VCG, and then use u
(b) to denote the standard utility of agent i when her value is vi, the reported bids are b and the mechanism being run is VCG.
Our goal is to design a mechanism that is externalityresistant, in the following sense:
• The mechanism approximately maximizes social welfare.
• Despite the fact that each agent bids to maximize their externality-modified utility, each agent ends up with a base utility that is approximately what it would have been had all agents bid so as to maximize their base utility. Thus, non-spiteful agents are not harmed by the presence of spiteful agents. Furthermore, the auctioneer's revenue is not harmed by the presence of altruistic agents.
An immediate difficulty that arises is the fact that our utility model is non-quasi linear. Our approach is to consider a weaker solution concept, implementation in undominated strategies, formally defined as follows.
In a game of incomplete information, a strategy for an agent is a function mapping types to actions. We say that a strategy s ′ i for agent i is dominated by strategy si if for all types ti for agent i, and for all possible types t−i and all possible actions
of the other agents, the utility of agent i satisfies:
We say that a mechanism implements a predicate P in undominated strategies, if whenever agents are limited to playing undominated strategies, it must be that predicate P holds.
We consider the following simple variant of VCG, which we call externality-resistant VCG or rVCG , for short. The rVCG mechanism, with n agents participating, is parameterized by a value δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and works as follows:
• Ask the n agents for their values/bids.
• With probability δ/n single out the i-th agent and run the truth extraction mechanism (denoted by TE) on him.
• With probability 1 − δ, run VCG.
Our main theorem is the following: 
In the proof below, we use the following notation and definitions:
• For any set of bids b, let MSW(b) denote the maximum social welfare achievable with respect to the bids b, i.e.
where the maximum runs over all possible allocations a.
• We define MSWv i (bi, b−i) to be the maximum social welfare experienced by agent i, when agent i bids bi, whereas her true value is vi, and all other agents bid b−i. Thus,
where a * = argmax a j bj(a).
• The definitions of MSW and MSWv i will allow us to compare utilities that involve actual values and bids, in a clean way . For example, when agent i bids bi, her true value is vi, all agents but i bid b−i, then, the utility of agent i under VCG with Clarke Pivot Payments is
We can now turn to the proof of the theorem.
Proof. We assume that agents would like to maximize their externality-modified utility:
where
We say an agent is standard if γij = 0 for all j. Such an agent doesn't care about the utility of others. For standard agents, the base utility and the externality-modified utility are the same. In addition, because VCG is dominant strategy truthful, it is a dominant strategy for the standard agents to bid truthfully.
So, we only need to understand how non-standard agents will bid. To this end, fix an agent i of type ti and the bids b−i and types t−i of the other agents.
Suppose that the VCG part of rVCG is executed. Then agent i's externality-modified utility u
We want to compute the diference between agent i's externality modified utility when agent i bids bi and when agent i bids vi. We first observe that when we fix the bids b−i of all agents except agent i, the maximum social welfare experienced by agent i is achieved when she is truthful. Specifically,
To see this, let a * = argmax a {vi(a) + j =i bj (a)} be the allocation which optimizes the maximum social welfare experienced by agent i when she tells the truth; similarly, let a * = argmax a { j bj(a)}, be the allocation which optimizes the maximum social welfare experienced by agent i when she bids bi. Then MSW(vi,
We can now bound the difference between agent i's externality modified utility when agent i bids bi and when agent i bids vi with respect to ηi = |bi − vi|, the lie of agent i.
where γi = maxj γij.
On the other hand,
assuming valuations in the range [0, 1] and the use of the linear TE algorithm. Combining inequalities (9) and (10), we have
Consider any bid bi for which ηi = |bi − vi| has
Then the strategy of bidding truthfully dominates the strategy of bidding this bi. Thus, for all undominated strategies, it must be that agent i bids a value bi which satisfies:
implying that she will choose ηi so that
and thus
In other words, lying about vi by more than the right-hand side of Equation (11) is a strategy dominated by the truthtelling strategy.
From this, we can show that the utility of an agent in rVCG is close to the standard utility of VCG when all agents play undominated strategies. First notice that since the agents declare values with η = maxi ηi from their true values, we have
We can now conclude that for any agent ℓ who participates in rVCG, if all agents play undominated strategies, then:
The following two corollaries are immediate:
When rVCG is used and all agents play undominated strategies, the social welfare of the outcome a * selected satisfies
Corollary 2. When rVCG is used and all agents play undominated strategies, the profit of the auctioneer is at least his profit from running VCG with truthful agents minus 2nη.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have introduced a number of concepts and taken first steps towards understanding and applying these concepts. Clearly though, we have only scratched the surface.
For example, the basic tool of strongly truthful mechanisms may have some potential, but there is clearly much left to be understood. What is the right way to define strong truthfulness? What mechanisms achieve optimal relative strong truthfulness? What is the tradeoff between the "strength" of the truthfulness and the social welfare that can be achieved?
We explored a new utility model for externalities in the context of mechanism design and sought to design mechanisms that protect agents from these externalities. Our mechanism has some externality-resistance, however, the externality parameters have to be extremely small in order for our mechanism to be effective. Is it possible to do better? More concretely, our mechanism tolerates externality parameters of value γ = O(1/n 3 ). Are there mechanisms that tolerate higher values of γ? In the opposite direction, can we show a bound on the maximum γ?
What happens if we use a different solution concept? Also, while we chose to optimize for "base utility", that is not the only goal one might consider. One could optimize for social welfare with respect to the externality modified utilities. To what extent is this possible? Is this a reasonable goal? I.e., should the goal of the mechanism be to encourage spite?
APPENDIX A. STRONG TRUTHFULNESS AND SCOR-ING RULES
In this appendix, we develop the connection between strongly truthful single-agent mechanisms and "strongly proper" scoring rules [10, 7] . As mentioned above, this immediately relates strongly truthful mechanisms to a host of seemingly unrelated problems.
A.1 The setting
We consider the following setting:
• There is a set of n + 1 events, (call them events 0 through n) one of which will happen.
• The agent (forecaster) has a belief vector p as to which event will happen, where pi is the probability that event i happens. p0 = 1 − 1≤i≤n pi.
• The mechanism takes as input a postulated belief vectorp, and uses a scoring rule to determine the "payments" or "scores". Specifically, the scoring rule says for each outcome i, the "payment" or "score" the agent gets is si(p).
• The agent proposesp and obtains utility 0≤i≤n pisi(p).
• The scoring rule is strictly proper if reportingp = p strictly maximizes his utility.
A.2 Translating Mechanisms to Scoring Rules
Let M be a mechanism that takes as input an agent's valuations x1, . . . , xn for n alternatives. We assume xi ≥ 0 for all i and that i xi ≤ 1. The mechanism has allocation probabilities ai(x) and a payment rule P (x).
We convert this to a scoring rule S(M ) as follows: Given vector p representing the probabilities p1, . . . , pn of outcomes (with p0 = 1 − i pi), let si(p) = ai(p) − P (p), and let s0(p) = −P (p). Proof. By definition, the payoff to the agent when using the scoring rule and reportingp is
This is the same as
and thus the incentives for the scoring rule are identical to the incentives for the mechanism.
A.3 Translating Scoring Rules to Mechanisms
Let S be a non-trivial scoring rule. We assume that the si's are of bounded absolute value. We show how to convert this to a mechanism:
Define the constants C0 and C as follows: (si(p) − s0(p) + C0) .
Since the scoring rule is non-trivial, the payments (scores) are not constant and therefore C > 0. Notice that si(p) − s0(p) + C0 ≥ 0 and that i≤i≤n si(p) − s0(p) + C0 C ≤ 1.
The mechanism M (S) is now defined as follows.
• The mechanism takes as input the values xi for each of the alternatives 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We assume that xi ≥ 0 for all i and that 1≤i≤n xi ≤ 1.
• Define ai(x) = (si(x) − s0(x) + C0) /C. As observed above, i ai(x) ≤ 1 and ai(x) ≥ 0.
• Define P (x) = − s0(x) + (1 − i xi)C0 /C Proposition 2. If S is strictly proper, then M (S) is strictly truthful.
Proof. The utility of an agent playing this mechanism and reporting x is i xiai(x) − P (x). This is the same as If S is strictly proper then, it is strictly proper under the translation by C0 and scaling by C. Thus the utility of the agent in the mechanism is strictly maximized by reporting truthfully. • Let M be an m(x)-strongly truthful mechanism. Then S(M ) is an m(x)-strongly proper scoring rule.
A.4 Strong truthfulness
• Let S be an m(p)-strongly proper mechanism. Then M (S) is an m(x)/C strongly truthful mechanism.
Proof. The first part is immediate from the fact that utilities are precisely preserved under the transformation from mechanisms to scoring rules. For the second part, suppose that for scoring rule S A.5 Application to some standard scoring rules
• Logarithmic scoring rule: the translation doesn't work because C0 is unbounded.
• Quadratic scoring rule: si(p) = 1 + 2pi − ||p|| 2 . Then s1(p)−s0(p) = 2(p −(1−p)) = 4p −2 which is between -2 and 2. Thus C0 = 2 and C = 4. This translates into a(x) = x, which has m(x) = 1.
• Spherical scoring rule: si(p) = pi/||p||. Then s1(p) − s0(p) = (2p − 1)/ p 2 + (1 − p) 2 which is between -1 and 1. Thus C0 = 1 and C = 2. This translates into a(x) = 1 2 + 2x − 1 2 x 2 + (1 − x) 2 .
The m(x) value is half that of the spherical rule.
